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Abstract:  
In this paper, we provide new evidence on the determinants of absenteeism using 
the Workplace Employee Survey (WES) 1999-2002 from Statistics Canada. Our 
paper extends the typical labour-leisure model used to analyze the decision to skip 
work to include firm-level policy variables relevant to the absenteeism decision and 
uncertainty about the cost of absenteeism. It also provides a non-linear econometric 
model that explicitly takes into account the count nature of absenteeism data and 
unobserved heterogeneity at both the individual and firm level. Controlling for very 
detailed demographic, job and firm characteristics (including workplace practices), we 
find that dissatisfaction with contracted hours is a significant determinant of absence. 
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we provide new evidence on the determinants of absenteeism
using linked employer-employee data. It has long been recognized that while
the decision to skip work is made by the individual, reasons for doing so might
also be related to personnel considerations or the organizational structure of
the firm (Frankel (1921)). Linked data thus provides a unique opportunity to
disentangle conflicting causes of absenteeism.
Despite its rising frequency and associated cost, there are relatively few
studies on the determinants of absenteeism. Moreover, it could be argued that
most of the existing studies on the determinants of absenteeism suffer from the
use of less than adequate data. A first strand of the literature focuses on only
one kind of absenteeism, namely absenteeism due (officially) to health reasons.
These studies generally use data from a health insurance company or government
agency.1 A second strand of the literature uses detailed absenteeism data from
one company or a very small sample of firms2. It is not clear that their results
are generalizable outside their small samples.3,4,5
Our work is thus more closely related to the second strand of the literature
1For example, Henrekson and Persson (2004) use aggregate data from the National Social
Insurance Board of Sweden, Johansson and Palme (2002) use data from the 1991 Swedish
Level of Living Survey (SLLS). In the U.S., Vistnes (1997) uses the 1987 National Medical
Expenditure Survey.
2Kauermann and Ortlieb (2004) have absenteeism data from one German firm. Barmby
(2002) also has data on only one UK manufacturing firm. Delgado and Kiesner (1997) focus
on London buses operators. Drago and Wooden (1992) work on a sample of 15 firms from the
U.S., Canada and New-Zealand. Barmby, Orme, and Treble (1991) use data on four factories
of an unidentified firm. Wilson and Peel (1991) have data on a sample of 52 firms in the
engineering and metal industry in the United Kingdom. Dunn and Youngblood (1986) use
1977 data from one utility company.
3A notable exception is Allen (1981) who uses the 1972-73 Quality of Employment Survey.
However, this survey does not have any information about the employer and therefore cannot
be used to study the link between workplace practices and absenteeism.
4Other papers focusing on absenteeism include Gilleskie (1998) who focuses on the ab-
senteeism decision of individuals with acute illnesses, Ehrenberg (1970) who studies the link
between absenteeism and the decision of the firm to use overtime, and Allen (1983) who
estimates the cost of absenteeism.
5A third strand takes a more macroeconomic approach. For example, Kenyon and Dawkins
(1989) use aggregate Australian time-series data.
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using employee level data. However, we examine the determinants of absen-
teeism using survey data, the Workplace Employee Survey (WES) 1999-2002
from Statistics Canada. The use of WES has numerous advantages for the study
of the determinants of absenteeism: (1) the survey is designed to be represen-
tative of the whole universe of firm operating in Canada; (2) in each sampled
firm, a subset of workers from the firm was sampled so that the survey is also
representative of the universe of workers in Canada6; (3) since the survey is
linked, we have detailed micro data on each of these workers, including days of
absenteeism during the year, demographic and job characteristics, preferences
and human capital variables (this is in addition to the usual firm-level charac-
teristics); (4) each worker was asked to recall the number of days absent from
work in the past year; (5) the linked nature of the data allows us to take into
account firm unobserved heterogeneity; (6) and the longitudinal nature of the
data allows us to take into account worker unobserved heterogeneity.
We start first by extending the typical labor-leisure model used to analyze
the decision to skip work to include firm-level policy variables relevant to the ab-
senteeism decision and uncertainty about the cost of absenteeism to the worker.
We next describe an econometric model that explicitly takes into account the
count data nature of absenteeism data and also incorporates unobserved het-
erogeneity at both the individual and firm level. Data sources and variable
descriptions are presented in Section 4. We describe the results in section 5 and
briefly conclude in the final section.
6Abowd and Kramarz (1999) classify WES as a survey in which both the sample of work-
places and the sample of workers are cross-sectionally representative of the target population.
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2 Theoretical Framework
We use the typical labor-leisure choice model to study the absenteeism decision
(see Allen (1981), Allen (1983), Barmby, Orme, and Treble (1991), Delgado and
Kiesner (1997) and Dunn and Youngblood (1986))7. We assume that each job
offers a work schedule as well as a wage rate. Since search is costly, a worker
may accept a job offer even though at the contracted number of work hours (tc)
his marginal rate of substitution between leisure and income does not equal the
wage rate (w). When a worker contracts for more than his desired hours given
w, he retains an incentive to consume more leisure. One way of doing so is to
be absent from work. In this theoretical framework, an emphasis will be placed
on the explicit random cost of such a decision and on how the firms and jobs
characteristics affect this decision. These two aspects will become important in
the empirical part of the paper and have not been addressed in the literature.
Absenteeism results in lost output when the absent worker is replaced by
someone who is generally less efficient or is not replaced at all. For the em-
ployment relation to continue, the firm must be compensated for this loss. In
addition to losing earnings he would have received if he had reported, the worker
faces a penalty (D) for each scheduled work period missed. In practice, this
penalty will be observed in the form of a decreased probability of receiving a
promotion or merit wage increase and an increased likelihood of being dismissed.
Denoting time absent form work as ta, one can then write
D = D (ta) D ′ ≥ 0, D′′ ≥ 0, D (0) = 0
The workers who miss the most days pay the largest penalties. The costs of in-
creased amounts of absenteeism to the firm are presumed to be non-decreasing,
7The following discussion is also drawn from Vistnes (1997) and Johansson and Palme
(1996). See Hausman (1980) and Blomquist (1983) for the foundations of the basic model.
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yielding a constant or graduated penalty structure. Workers with perfect atten-
dance records are not penalized at all. Since the worker does not really know
this potential cost when he makes his decision, we consider the possibility that
D (ta) can be a random variable. So, we write D˜ (ta) when this is the case.
Holding work schedule flexibility constant, the work attendance decision
can be analyzed within the traditional labor-leisure choice framework. Workers
maximize an expected utility function containing consumption (C) and leisure
time (L) as its arguments8
EU = EU (C,L;P, F ) . (1)
The expected utility of the worker is also a function of a vector of personal
characteristics (P ) and a vector of firm characteristics (F ). Letting R equal the
individual non-labor income, the budget constraint of the worker is
R+ w (tc − (1− sL)ta)− D˜ (ta) = C (2)
where the price of the consumption good C is normalized to one and sL is a
variable that takes the value of one if a worker has full sick leave benefits9 and
less than one otherwise. Workers also face a time constraint of
t− tc − ta − tl = 0 (3)
where t represents the total amount of time in the period under consideration
and tl is leisure hours. So we can write ta + tl = L. Substitution of (2) and (3)
8See Dionne and Eeckhoudt (1987) for such a theoretical framework.
9We use the same hypothesis as Vistnes (1997) of modelling sL as a binary variable due
to data limitations. As in Vistnes (1997), detailed information on sick leave provisions, such
as the stock of sick leave, carry-over provisions, whether sick leave benefits pay the worker
fully or partially, and wheter the sick leave can be applied toward early retirement or used for
maternity leave, is not available. Detailed job characteristics in the empirical analysis may
serve as proxies for these provisions.
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in (1) and differentiation of the latter with respect to ta produces the first-order
condition
E
[
UL − (w (1− sL) + D˜ ′(ta))UC
]
= 0 (4)
where Uk > 0 indicates the partial derivative of U with respect to k = L,C.
The variable D˜ (ta) can be expressed more directly by defining wa as the cost
of being absent. So we can write D˜ (ta) = wata and, as already mentioned, wa
can be a random variable when the decision on ta is made. In this case, the first
order condition (4) becomes
E [UL − (w (1− sL) + wa)UC ] = 0. (5)
A worker will be absent on any given day as long as the extra leisure is more
valuable to him than the sum of the wages he would have earned that day and
the resulting loss in future earnings. This means that the shadow price of time
for absent workers is greater than the contracted wage.
By differentiating the first-order conditions for sL = 0 and applying Cramer’s
Rule, one can show, under the usual conditions of an upward sloping labor
supply curve, that
∂ta
∂w
< 0,
∂ta
∂R
> 0,
∂ta
∂tc
> 0,
∂ta
∂Risk
< 0,
∂ta
E (wa)
< 0. (6)
where Risk is a measure of the risk associated to wa and E (wa) its mean. See
Dionne and Eeckhoudt (1987) for a sufficient condition yielding dta/dRisk < 0.
(Details for the derivation of results in (6) are in Appendix).
The effect of a change in the wage rate on time absent from work is am-
biguous a priori because income and substitution effects operate in opposite
directions. However, under the conditions of an upward sloping labor supply
curve, a negative sign is obtained when sL = 0 or is sufficiently small. An in-
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crease in non-labor income leads to more demand for all non-inferior goods and
services, including time absent from work. If the number of contracted hours
changes, the number of absences move in the same direction. Increased penal-
ties for absenteeism reduce the number of days missed; as does an increased risk
of penalty.
In cases where full sick leave is available, the product of w and ta disappears
from (2) and the first–order equilibrium condition becomes
E [UL − waUC ] = 0. (7)
Unless the penalty function is made steeper, an individual will be absent more
frequently in plants where sick leave is fully paid to absent workers. It should
be noted that the effect of a wage change on the likelihood of absence is unam-
biguously positive in this case because there is no longer a substitution effect.
Denoting the scheduling flexibility permitted by one’s employer as f (we
expect ∂tA/∂f < 0), the model can be summarized as
tA = tA( w, R, tc, E(wa), Risk, f).
(−) (+) (+) (−) (−) (−)
(8)
We provide a structural form for these relationships in the next section.
3 Empirical Specification
From the above behavioral model, we can derive a structural econometric model
of the absenteeism decision. Extending the model of Hausman (1980) and
Blomquist (1983) proposed for labor force participation, we can write the fol-
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lowing functional form for the utility function:
U
(
C, ta + tl;P, F
)
= exp
{
−
(
1 +
β
(
C + P + F
)
b− t+ (ta + tl)
)}(
t− (ta + tl)− b
β
)
(9)
where
P = P/β − α/β2, F = F/β − α/β2, b = α/β,
α and β are parameters and absolute risk aversion is assumed equal to one10.
From this utility function, one can verify that the first order condition yields
ta = tc − α (w (1− sL) + E (wa) + 1/2σ2)− β (R+ tcwsL)− γP − ηF (10)
assuming normal distribution for wa, which yields σ2 as the measure of risk. In
a more compact form, (10) can be rewritten as
ta = tc − αw∗ − βR∗ − γP − ηF
where w∗ can be interpreted as the relative cost of being absent and R∗ as the
virtual benefit or income related to absence. A positive α parameter and a
negative β parameter are expected.
In this simple model, when preferences are not random, days of absenteeism
can be represented by a Poisson process (see Hausman, Hall, and Griliches
(1984); Gourie´roux, Monfort, and Trognon (1984)). In fact, since absences
are recorded as non-negative integers, modeling such data with a continuous
distribution could lead to inconsistent parameter estimates. Let ta
ijt
be the
observed number of days of absenteeism for employee i in firm j at time t. The
10See Johansson and Palme (1996), for a similar model where the firms variables are not
considered and wa is not present in the budget constraint.
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basic model is
P (ta
ijt
| λijt) = e
−λijt (λijt)
ta
ijt
ta
ijt
!
(11)
with
λijt = tcijt − αw∗ijt − βR∗ijt − γPit − ηFjt > 0.
It should be repeated that tc
ijt
(contracted hours) are exogenous in the model.
This decision variable is already fixed when the worker (or nature) makes a
decision about ta.
It is typical to introduce unobserved heterogeneity in the Poisson model in
a multiplicative form through λijt. Unobserved heterogeneity should be present
because many non observable factors in the data set can affect the sensitivity
to economic incentives related to work absence decisions. We use the following
parameterization for λijt
λijt = exp(δij + ψj + θij) (12)
where
δij = tcijt − αw∗ijt − βR∗ijt − γPit − ηFjt
The additional parameter ψj captures unobservable factors of the firm orthog-
onal to other observed firm characteristics. We assume firm unobserved hetero-
geneity to be normally distributed with mean zero. The variance of ψj (σψ) is
identified by the observation of many workers coming from the same firm.
Since we do not observe worker mobility due to the design of the survey,
we do not include pure worker unobserved heterogeneity but because of the
longitudinal nature of the data, we have repeated observations on the employer-
employee relationship which allows us to take into account unobserved job het-
erogeneity (θij). We also assume that θij is distributed normally with variance
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σθ and is orthogonal to ψj11. Firm unobserved heterogeneity might proxy for
the cost of absence to the firm when observed heterogeneity is not sufficiently
informative. For example, the cost of absence to the firm might be pretty low if
substitute workers are easily available and are as productive as regular workers
(Allen (1983)) and therefore, the econometrician might observe higher absen-
teeism than in an otherwise identical firm where such substitute workers are not
available. From a statistical point of view, it is necessary to take into account
both sources of heterogeneity in order to avoid the problem of spurious regres-
sions due to multiple observations on the same worker over time and the same
firm characteristics over its employees.
The joint likelihood is obtained by numerically integrating out the hetero-
geneity components from the product of the conditional likelihoods of the firms,
assuming joint normality of the heterogeneity components. Since a closed form
solution to the integral does not exist, the likelihood was computed by approx-
imating the normal integral by a weighted sum over “conditional likelihoods”,
i.e. likelihoods conditional on certain well-chosen values of the residual.
4 Data
We use data from the Workplace and Employee Survey (WES) 1999-2002 con-
ducted by Statistics Canada. The survey is both longitudinal and linked in that
it documents the characteristics of the workers and of the workplaces over time.
The target population for the “workplace” component of the survey is defined
as the collection of all Canadian establishments who paid employees in March
of the year of the survey. The survey, however, does not cover the Yukon, the
Northwest territories and Nunavut. Establishments operating in fisheries, agri-
11Note that this specification is not subject to the usual objections to the Poisson model
since the inclusion of firm and worker unobserved heterogeneity allows for dispersion at both
the worker and firm level.
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culture and cattle farming are also excluded. For the “employee” component,
the target population is the collection of all employees working, or on paid leave,
in the workplace target population.
The sample for the workplaces comes from the “Business registry” of Statis-
tics Canada which contains information on every business operating in Canada.
Employees are then sampled from an employees list provided by the selected
workplaces. For every workplace, a maximum of twelve employees are selected,
and for establishments with less than four employees, all employees are sampled.
In the case of total non-response, respondents are withdrawn entirely from the
survey and sampling weights are recalculated in order to preserve representa-
tiveness of the sample. WES selects new employees and workplaces in odd years
(at every third year for employees and at every fifth year for workplaces). We
used the final sampling weights for employees as recommended by Statistics
Canada in all our regressions.
We finally exclude establishments with less than ten employees from the
sample because survey questions on work practices were not intended for them.
Individuals who did no work throughout the year are also included but we
control for their limited exposure to the risk of being absent in our regression
framework. The rich structure of the data set allows us to control for a variety
of factors determining absenteeism decisions. From the worker questionnaire,
we are able to extract detailed demographic characteristics including measures
of health, human capital, job satisfaction and income from other sources. More-
over, we use detailed explanatory variables on the employment contract includ-
ing wage, contracted hours and information about working hours flexibility and
when these working hours take place.
From the firm questionnaire, we are able to construct firm size indicators
and build measures of turnover and vacancy rates. Even more important, the
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establishment questionnaire includes very detailed information about changes in
organizational practices (15 indicators) and current workplace practices (6). We
complement those by adding some indicators for the type of nonwage benefits
that the firm offers to its workers. Finally, our regressions include industry (13),
occupation (6) and time (4) dummies. Summary statistics on all explanatory
variables are presented in Table 1 for the dependent variable, Table 2 for the
employees and Table 3 for the employer. Note that week absent in Table 1 refers
to a five day workweek. Thus zero means the worker was absent strictly less
than five days.
5 Results
Complete estimation results are presented in the multiple parts of Table 4. The
first column presents results from the estimation of the standard Poisson model
from equation (12) and column “IRR” shows the corresponding incidence rate
ratios. The two next columns show estimation results from a zero-inflated Pois-
son (ZIP) model. This other model accounts for the prevalence of zero counts in
the absenteeism data. The ZIP Poisson model also takes into account the fact
that the determinants of zero counts could be different from the determinants
of the number of days of absenteeism, due to job design or matching in the job
market for example.
In all models, the dependent variable is the number of days of absence that
are reported for the whole year. Note that the survey distinguishes between paid
sick leave, unpaid leave and other paid leave12. Using days of absence in this
type of survey might be problematic if the distribution of days of absence is not
smooth. Moreover, it is possible that the respondent’s ability to recall absences
12Other paid leave does not include vacations, paternity/maternity leave or absence due to
strikes or lock-out.
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for a full year is not as good as we would like it to be13. For these reasons, in
our empirical analysis, we also tested the model using weeks of absenteeism as
the dependent variable. Since results did not differ, we show only results for
days of absenteeism14.
Note that we were not able to estimate the full specification with parametriza-
tion (12) since the firm and employee random effects are not nested. Non-linear
models with more than one variance component are very hard to estimate due to
their high dimensionality, especially if the random effects are not nested, which
is the case with firm and individual heterogeneity. Many methods have been
proposed to overcome such numerical difficulties (see Lee and Nelder (1996) and
Jiang (1998)) but unfortunately, it turns out that none are robust enough to
deal with data sets of the size we use in this analysis. We compared results
between two specifications, workplace or worker unobserved heterogeneity and
since results did not differ much between the two specifications, we present re-
sults including worker heterogeneity only. Finally, in what follows, we focus
mainly on coefficients and incidence rate ratios from the Poisson model but
discuss results from the ZIP model when they differ.
Demographics and health We find that women are likely more likely to
be absent. Women have 1.17 times the absence rate of men and this effect is
even stronger if there are kids younger than six years old in the household15.
Being married reduces absenteeism but the effect is significant at the 10% level
only. Health is also found to be a very important determinant of the absen-
teeism decision. Individuals with no activity limitation have less than half the
incidence rate of individuals with activity limitations. The impact of health
13Unfortunately, it is not possible to compare the number of absences as reported by the
worker to administrative measures.
14The structure of the data also does not allow us to study episodes of absenteeism.
15Vistnes (1997) also finds a significant interaction between being a women and having
young kids.
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is slightly less important in the ZIP model but also a statistically significant
positive determinant of the probability of having no absenteeism which suggests
that individuals with activity limitations will also be matched with jobs where
absenteeism is permitted
Human capital Even with the detailed data we have on degrees obtained,
we find almost no impact of schooling on absenteeism except for the category
“University certificate above bachelor degree”. The only two measures of human
capital that are related to absenteeism decisions are seniority (positive but at a
diminishing rate) and whether the individual received training in the past year
(negative).
Preference and job satisfaction We find very strong evidence that dis-
satisfaction with job contracts is related to absence. Workers who indicated
that they would prefer to work more hours for more pay are less often absent
and workers who would prefer to work less hours for less pay are more often
absent. We think this is the strongest evidence yet that absenteeism decisions
act as a mechanism to adjust hours to the worker’s optimal schedule. Job sat-
isfaction is also strongly related to absence. Workers who reported being very
satisfied or satisfied with their job have 0.83 times the absence rate of dissatisfied
individuals.
Income, wage and hours We find that, as predicted by our theoretical
model, increasing income from other sources is related to more absence. The
coefficient on wages is negative as predicted although the effect is not signifi-
cant. We get a negative sign for contracted hours but the effect is very small.
This could be due to the fact that a fair share of our sample does not work
regular hours every week. Since we do not observe the contract, our measure
14
of contracted hours is more a measure of the number of usual hours worked on
average per week.
Work arrangement and technology use It has been said that new
work arrangements lead to more stress and more absenteeism. Using detailed
data about the scheduling of the work week, we find that workers who are able
to do part of their work at home are less often absent and that workers who work
on a reduced workweek are more often absent. Turning to technology, we find
that workers using other technologies (such as cash registers, sales terminals,
scanners, etc) have a higher incidence rate of absenteeism.
Organizational change Firms would normally be interested in finding
what organizational practices succeed in reducing absenteeism when it is costly.
We find that centralization and the introduction of flexible working hours in the
firm are associated with higher absenteeism, while job rotation (or multi-skilling)
and outsourcing are related to lower absenteeism16. It is interesting to contrast
the impact of these organizational changes in the ZIP model. For example, the
impact of outsourcing shows up only in the Poisson part of the ZIP model while
the impact of centralization shows up only in the inflated part. This means that
outsourcing is associated with reduced incidence of absenteeism while central-
ization is probably associated with reduction in “permitted” absenteeism in the
job design.
Workplace practices We find no impact for flexible job design, sugges-
tion programs, information sharing, the use of solving teams, labour-management
committees and self-directed workgroups on absenteeism17. We do however find
16In separate work, we look at correlations between individual workplace practices in order
to verify if some practices were most likely to be used in conjunction with others. Since no
correlation is above 0.5, we decide against using “bundles” of practices.
17Drago and Wooden (1992) find that workgroup cohesion is associated with lower levels of
absence if job satisfaction is high and Wilson and Peel (1991) find that firms with participation
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that workplaces that offer family support have more absences, but this effect
works through the inflated part of the Poisson model which suggests it is also
due to job design.
Cost of absenteeism We construct two measures of the indirect cost
of absenteeism. We make the hypothesis that the worker is less likely to be
penalized for his absence (through lower promotion probabilities) if vacancy
rates are high and layoff rates are low. Although we find that our coefficients
have the expected effects, neither are statistically significant.
Firm size, occupations, industry and time effects We find absen-
teeism to be greater in large firms and for all occupations compared to man-
agers. Interestingly, we find no interindustry differentials in the incidence of
absenteeism but the large majority of industry dummies18 are statistically sig-
nificant in the inflated part of the ZIP model which suggests big industry differ-
ences in job design. Finally, all year dummies are negative. Since the reference
year is 1999, we conclude that increases in absenteeism in that time period were
probably due to changes in the workforce composition and job mix.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we provide a careful examination of the factors associated with
the absenteeism decision at the worker level using survey data where the infor-
mation on the worker is linked to information about the workplace, something
that has rarely been done. The data we use allow us to control for detailed
demographic worker, job and firm characteristics. We find strong evidence that
dissatisfaction with contracted hours is related to absence. We find that most
schemes had significantly lower average absenteeism. These findings are not corroborated by
our data.
18The ommited category is natural ressources.
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human capital effects work through seniority and training. The predictions of
our theoretical model are consistent with our results except for the coefficient
on contracted hours which may be due to measurement error. We do not find
strong indications that non traditional work arrangement lead to absenteeism.
But the possibility of working at home is associated with lower absences. We
find that firms that showed increased reliance on external suppliers (outsourc-
ing) also saw absenteeism diminish.
Future work should be on devising estimation methods that would take into
account the linked nature of the data. Such an estimation framework could be
based on Monte Carlo Markov Chain methods to take into account the fact that
the firm and worker effects are not nested. Also, it would be interesting to see
if the determinants of absenteeism differ depending on the type of absenteeism
(paid/unpaid, sick leave/other leave).
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A Comparative Statics of ta
Decision with Respect to Different Parameters
The first order condition with respect to ta is equal to:
E [UL − (w (1− sL) + wa)UC ] = 0.
We write H < 0 for the second order condition that is easily verified under risk
aversion. We assume that leisure is not an inferior good.
So differentiating with respect to R yields:
dta
dR
= − 1
H
E
(
ULC − wtUCC
)
> 0
when L is not an inferior good under certainty.
Now differentiating with respect to w yields:
dta
dw
=
1
H
EUC (1− sL)− 1
H
E
(
ULC − wtUCC
)
(tc − (1− sL) ta)
where
wt ≡ w (1− sL) + wa > 0.
This can be rewritten as
dta
dw
= − 1
H
E
[− (1− sL)UC + (ULC − wtUCC) (tc − (1− sL) ta)]
which is negative under normal conditions of positive labor supply curve and
when sL = 0 or small. When sL = 1, the effect is positive.
The sign of dta/dtc is given by the sign
dta
dtc
= − 1
H
E
[
ULC − wtUCC
]
w > 0.
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The sign of dta/dE (wa) is the same as that of dta/dwa under certainty.
dta
dE (wa)
= − 1
H
E
[−UC − (ULC − wtUCC) ta] < 0
when L is not an inferior good under certainty.
Finally, the sign of dta/d (Risk) is that of
dta
d (Risk)
1
ta
= UCC (1− taI) + UCta ∂I
∂wa
< 0
where
I ≡ ULC − w
tUCC
UC
> 0
if leisure is not an inferior good: 1 − taI is positive when the supply curve of
labor is positive and ∂I/∂wa is non-increasing using an intuitive condition on
the variation of proportional risk aversion along the budget line (see Dionne and
Eeckhoudt (1987), for more details).
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Table 1: Summary statistics on absenteeism in Canada (1999)
Weeks absent
Freq. %
0 9,717,342 90.16
1 669,090 6.21
2 185,702 1.72
3 25,927 0.24
4 31,343 0.29
5 7,437 0.07
6 22,676 0.21
7 14,159 0.13
8 15,538 0.14
9 10,675 0.10
10 3,986 0.04
(...) (...)
Total 10,777,543 100.00
Table 2: Summary statistics - Employees
1999 2001
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Dependent variable
Days of absence 5.837 19.003 5.955 9.917
Demographic characteristics
Women 0.521 0.500 0.506 0.500
Black 0.011 0.104 0.014 0.119
Other race 0.280 0.449 0.309 0.462
Language 0.092 0.289 0.110 0.313
Immigrant 0.175 0.380 0.199 0.400
Years since immigration 3.988 10.181 4.361 10.594
Married 0.566 0.496 0.541 0.498
Number of pre-school aged kids 0.247 0.569 0.248 0.581
Health
No activity limitation 0.955 0.208 0.937 0.243
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Table 2: Cont’d
1999 2001
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Human Capital 0.107 0.309 0.120 0.325
High school degree 0.175 0.380 0.179 0.384
Industry certified training 0.020 0.141 0.011 0.104
Other training 0.033 0.179 0.022 0.147
Trade or vocational certificate 0.088 0.283 0.098 0.297
Some college 0.104 0.305 0.108 0.310
Complete college 0.181 0.385 0.188 0.391
Some university 0.077 0.266 0.067 0.249
Teacher’s college 0.002 0.049 0.001 0.030
University certificate below bachelor degree 0.018 0.132 0.020 0.138
Bachelor degree 0.130 0.337 0.133 0.339
University certificate above bachelor degree 0.019 0.135 0.015 0.120
Master’s degree 0.031 0.174 0.028 0.165
Degree in medicine or law 0.008 0.092 0.007 0.085
Earned doctorate 0.006 0.078 0.005 0.067
Seniority 8.745 8.192 8.518 8.206
Experience 16.167 10.714 16.411 10.993
Received training in the past year 0.369 0.483 0.339 0.473
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Table 2: Cont’d
1999 2001
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Workplace Benefits
medic 0.544 0.498 0.518 0.500
life 0.579 0.494 0.572 0.495
dental 0.532 0.499 0.553 0.497
uispl 0.330 0.470 0.312 0.463
stock 0.079 0.270 0.068 0.252
empstck 0.063 0.244 0.058 0.235
Professions
manager 0.151 0.358 0.112 0.315
prof 0.162 0.368 0.175 0.380
tech 0.390 0.488 0.414 0.493
sale 0.084 0.277 0.085 0.279
office 0.140 0.347 0.137 0.344
othoccup 0.074 0.262 0.077 0.267
Number of observations 23540 20377
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Table 3: Summary statistics - Employers
1999
Mean Std.Dev.
Changes in organisational practices
Integration 0.247 0.431
Centralization 0.127 0.333
Downsizing 0.131 0.338
Decentralization 0.075 0.264
Temporary 0.064 0.245
Use part-time 0.126 0.332
Re-engineering 0.335 0.472
Use overtime 0.133 0.340
Adopted flexible time 0.201 0.401
Destratification 0.069 0.254
Rotation 0.253 0.435
TQM 0.205 0.404
Outsourcing 0.158 0.364
Collaboration 0.186 0.389
Other changes 0.009 0.095
Workplace Practices
Suggestion program 0.303 0.460
Flexible job hours 0.308 0.462
Information sharing 0.496 0.500
Teams 0.256 0.437
Committee 0.197 0.398
Workgroups 0.103 0.305
Cost of absenteeism
Vacancy rate 0.026 0.062
Layoff rate 0.101 0.374
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Table 3: Cont’d
1999
Mean Std.Dev.
Size
10-19 employees 0.461 0.499
20-99 employees 0.460 0.498
100-499 employees 0.070 0.255
500 employees and more 0.010 0.098
Industry
Natural resources 0.015 0.120
Primary product manufacturing 0.025 0.156
Secondary product manufacturing 0.030 0.170
Labour intensive tertiary manufacturing 0.045 0.208
Capital intensive tertiary manufacturing 0.048 0.214
Construction 0.053 0.223
Transportation 0.134 0.340
Communication and other utilities 0.022 0.146
Retail trade and consumer service 0.302 0.459
Finance and insurance 0.069 0.253
Real estate 0.014 0.117
Business services 0.110 0.313
Education and health services 0.103 0.304
Information and cultural industries 0.031 0.174
N = 4072
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Table 4: Poisson regressions on days of absenteeism
Poisson Model RE ZIP Poisson
Coef. IRR Poisson Inflate
Demographic characteristics
Women 0.161** 1.174** 0.075 -0.244***
(0.065) (0.076) (0.060) (0.064)
Black -0.100 0.905 -0.061 0.070
(0.152) (0.138) (0.135) (0.168)
Other race -0.051 0.950 -0.001 0.146***
(0.060) (0.057) (0.056) (0.057)
Language at work differs from the one at home 0.045 1.046 0.011 -0.095
(0.067) (0.070) (0.063) (0.079)
Immigrant -0.134 0.875 -0.095 0.109
(0.141) (0.124) (0.130) (0.127)
Years since immigration 0.004 1.004 0.004 0.000
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Married -0.092* 0.912* -0.067 0.087*
(0.049) (0.044) (0.047) (0.051)
Number of pre-school aged kids -0.160*** 0.852*** -0.127*** 0.089
(0.057) (0.048) (0.046) (0.067)
Women * pre-school aged kids 0.248*** 1.282*** 0.221*** -0.108
(0.078) (0.100) (0.070) (0.093)
Health
No activity limitation -0.857*** 0.424*** -0.711*** 0.460***
(0.067) (0.029) (0.064) (0.080)
Statistical significance: *=10%; **=5%; ***=1%.
Robust standard error in parantheses
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Table 4: Cont’d
RE Poisson RE ZIP Poisson
Coef. IRR Poisson Inflate
Human Capital
High school degree -0.115 0.892 -0.153* -0.043
(0.098) (0.087) (0.091) (0.082)
Industry certified training 0.011 1.011 -0.089 -0.138
(0.167) (0.169) (0.149) (0.216)
Other training -0.086 0.918 -0.202 -0.162
(0.177) (0.162) (0.165) (0.132)
Trade or vocational certificate 0.096 1.101 0.040 -0.168
(0.110) (0.122) (0.100) (0.101)
Some college 0.156 1.169 0.054 -0.249**
(0.112) (0.130) (0.103) (0.102)
Complete college -0.028 0.972 -0.103 -0.198**
(0.109) (0.106) (0.102) (0.089)
Some university 0.064 1.066 -0.012 -0.183*
(0.121) (0.129) (0.113) (0.107)
Teacher’s college -0.189 0.828 -0.412** -0.675
(0.275) (0.228) (0.173) (0.432)
University certificate below bachelor degree -0.005 0.995 -0.078 -0.142
(0.148) (0.147) (0.136) (0.136)
Bachelor degree -0.029 0.971 -0.105 -0.164
(0.119) (0.115) (0.111) (0.118)
University certificate above bachelor degree 0.469** 1.598** 0.378** -0.152
(0.186) (0.298) (0.173) (0.159)
Master’s degree 0.025 1.026 -0.059 -0.153
(0.158) (0.162) (0.152) (0.181)
Degree in medicine or law -0.340* 0.712* -0.344* 0.088
(0.205) (0.146) (0.181) (0.285)
Earned doctorate 0.238 1.269 0.324 0.190
(0.461) (0.586) (0.464) (0.324)
Seniority 0.037*** 1.037*** 0.033*** -0.010
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Seniority squared (/100) -0.101*** 0.904*** -0.084*** 0.039
(0.028) (0.025) (0.027) (0.029)
Experience -0.013 0.987 -0.011 0.008
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Experience squared (/100) 0.021 1.021 0.022 0.000
(0.018) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017)
Received training in the past year -0.115** 0.892** -0.185*** -0.209***
(0.051) (0.045) (0.047) (0.052)
Statistical significance: *=10%; **=5%; ***=1%.
Robust standard error in parantheses
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Table 4: Cont’d
RE Poisson RE ZIP Poisson
Coef. IRR Poisson Inflate
Preferences and Job Satisfaction
Would prefer to work more hours for more pay -0.119* 0.888* -0.151** -0.053
(0.069) (0.061) (0.065) (0.058)
Would prefer to work less hours for less pay 0.258*** 1.294*** 0.160** -0.265***
(0.066) (0.085) (0.064) (0.079)
Satisfied with job -0.192*** 0.825*** -0.130* 0.154***
(0.072) (0.059) (0.067) (0.067)
Income
Total family income (000s) -0.000 1.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Income from other sources (000s) 0.002*** 1.002*** 0.002*** -0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Wage Contract
Natural logarithm of hourly wage -0.103 0.902 -0.086 0.110
(0.074) (0.066) (0.070) (0.074)
Contracted hours -0.005 0.995 -0.010** -0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
Work arrangement
Works regular hours 0.052 1.053 0.195** 0.335***
(0.086) (0.091) (0.078) (0.068)
Usual workweek includes Saturday and Sunday -0.028 0.972 0.015 0.099
(0.081) (0.078) (0.076) (0.080)
Work flexible hours 0.010 1.010 0.035 0.074
(0.053) (0.053) (0.050) (0.047)
Does not work from MtoF between 6am and 6pm -0.037 0.964 -0.086 -0.221***
(0.072) (0.070) (0.068) (0.066)
Some work done at home -0.122* 0.885* -0.070 0.126*
(0.074) (0.065) (0.071) (0.065)
Work some rotating shift 0.021 1.022 -0.034 -0.138
(0.096) (0.098) (0.091) (0.085)
Work on a reduced workweek 0.270** 1.310** 0.252** -0.059
(0.107) (0.141) (0.101) (0.100)
Work on compressed work week schedule 0.012 1.012 0.044 0.034
(0.093) (0.094) (0.085) (0.091)
Covered by a collective bargaining agreement 0.278*** 1.320*** 0.193*** -0.238***
(0.058) (0.076) (0.056) (0.057)
Technology
Use computer -0.081 0.922 -0.112 -0.054
(0.075) (0.069) (0.069) (0.058)
Use computer assisted design 0.084 1.088 0.054 -0.108**
(0.061) (0.066) (0.059) (0.056)
Use other technology 0.134*** 1.143*** 0.075 -0.157***
(0.052) (0.059) (0.049) (0.054)
Statistical significance: *=10%; **=5%; ***=1%.
Robust standard error in parantheses31
Table 4: Cont’d
RE Poisson RE ZIP Poisson
Coef. IRR Poisson Inflate
Changes in organisational practices
Integration -0.064 0.938 -0.066 -0.041
(0.055) (0.052) (0.052) (0.063)
Centralization 0.121* 1.128* 0.068 -0.182***
(0.062) (0.070) (0.059) (0.057)
Downsizing -0.018 0.982 -0.009 0.020
(0.050) (0.050) (0.048) (0.052)
Decentralization 0.007 1.007 0.009 0.013
(0.076) (0.076) (0.072) (0.079)
Temporary 0.007 1.007 -0.022 -0.147**
(0.065) (0.065) (0.063) (0.069)
Use part-time 0.011 1.011 0.017 0.049
(0.066) (0.067) (0.064) (0.066)
Re-engineering 0.039 1.040 0.058 0.075
(0.060) (0.062) (0.057) (0.057)
Use overtime -0.059 0.943 -0.050 0.081
(0.060) (0.057) (0.058) (0.069)
Adopted flexible time 0.185*** 1.203*** 0.173*** -0.069
(0.063) (0.075) (0.059) (0.061)
Destratification 0.094 1.098 0.093 0.052
(0.063) (0.069) (0.060) (0.065)
Rotation -0.171*** 0.843*** -0.093* 0.164***
(0.053) (0.045) (0.051) (0.057)
TQM 0.000 1.000 -0.038 -0.103*
(0.052) (0.052) (0.050) (0.055)
Outsourcing -0.120** 0.887** -0.112** 0.009
(0.056) (0.050) (0.053) (0.064)
Collaboration -0.024 0.976 -0.046 -0.021
(0.056) (0.054) (0.053) (0.057)
Other changes 0.029 1.029 0.064 0.112
(0.186) (0.191) (0.175) (0.108)
Statistical significance: *=10%; **=5%; ***=1%.
Robust standard error in parantheses
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Table 4: Cont’d
RE Poisson RE ZIP Poisson
Coef. IRR Poisson Inflate
Workplace Practices
Suggestion program 0.058 1.060 0.080 0.009
(0.054) (0.057) (0.050) (0.058)
Flexible working hours -0.055 0.946 -0.047 0.070
(0.060) (0.057) (0.055) (0.056)
Information sharing -0.014 0.986 -0.045 -0.053
(0.058) (0.057) (0.054) (0.059)
Problem solving teams -0.007 0.993 -0.005 -0.023
(0.060) (0.059) (0.055) (0.054)
Labour management committee 0.016 1.017 -0.004 -0.066
(0.065) (0.066) (0.061) (0.054)
Self-directed workgroups -0.091 0.913 -0.076 0.039
(0.070) (0.064) (0.064) (0.060)
Family support 0.109** 1.115** 0.066 -0.175***
(0.049) (0.055) (0.047) (0.048)
Non wage benefits -0.044 0.957 -0.138 -0.151
(0.100) (0.096) (0.091) (0.093)
Participate in supp. medical insurance 0.132** 1.141** 0.125** 0.012
(0.067) (0.076) (0.063) (0.061)
Participate in supp. life/disability insurance 0.148* 1.159* 0.071 -0.212***
(0.077) (0.090) (0.070) (0.068)
Participate in a dental plan -0.063 0.939 -0.074 -0.107
(0.080) (0.075) (0.074) (0.073)
Emp. offers supp. to EI ben. for parental leave 0.025 1.026 0.048 0.092*
(0.051) (0.052) (0.047) (0.048)
Participate in a stock purchase plan 0.247 1.281 0.276 0.166
(0.195) (0.250) (0.176) (0.152)
Employer contributes to stock purchase plan -0.167 0.846 -0.164 -0.143
(0.219) (0.186) (0.197) (0.161)
Cost of absenteeism
Vacancy rate 0.359 1.432 0.461 0.327
(0.591) (0.847) (0.572) (0.523)
Layoff rate -0.011 0.989 0.013 0.031
(0.062) (0.061) (0.042) (0.047)
Statistical significance: *=10%; **=5%; ***=1%.
Robust standard error in parantheses
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Table 4: Cont’d
RE Poisson RE ZIP Poisson
Coef. IRR Poisson Inflate
Firm Size
20-99 employees 0.142* 1.152* 0.131* 0.013
(0.080) (0.093) (0.073) (0.094)
100-499 employees 0.276*** 1.317** 0.240*** -0.076
(0.088) (0.115) (0.081) (0.097)
500 employees and more 0.171* 1.187* 0.163* -0.034
(0.094) (0.111) (0.086) (0.109)
Occupation
Professional 0.212** 1.237** 0.128 -0.178*
(0.102) (0.126) (0.092) (0.100)
Technician/Trades 0.270*** 1.310*** 0.187** -0.130
(0.103) (0.135) (0.093) (0.088)
Sales/Marketing 0.127 1.135 -0.016 -0.183
(0.144) (0.164) (0.132) (0.143)
Clerical/Administrative 0.157 1.170 0.032 -0.279***
(0.114) (0.133) (0.102) (0.101)
Other 0.297* 1.346* 0.233* -0.065
(0.153) (0.206) (0.140) (0.121)
Statistical significance: *=10%; **=5%; ***=1%.
Robust standard error in parantheses
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Table 4: Cont’d
RE Poisson RE ZIP Poisson
Coef. IRR Poisson Inflate
Industry
Primary product manuf. -0.006 0.994 -0.097 -0.181*
(0.163) (0.162) (0.153) (0.106)
Secondary product manuf. -0.059 0.943 -0.210 -0.280***
(0.172) (0.162) (0.163) (0.110)
Labour intensive tertiary manufac. -0.119 0.888 -0.255* -0.294***
(0.159) (0.141) (0.147) (0.114)
Capital intensive tertiary manufac. -0.101 0.904 -0.233 -0.265**
(0.158) (0.143) (0.146) (0.108)
Construction 0.117 1.125 0.072 -0.057
(0.178) (0.200) (0.165) (0.134)
Transportation -0.060 0.942 -0.180 -0.273***
(0.158) (0.149) (0.147) (0.110)
Communication and other utilities 0.086 1.089 -0.123 -0.486***
(0.176) (0.192) (0.166) (0.120)
Retail trade -0.035 0.966 -0.194 -0.343***
(0.162) (0.156) (0.151) (0.120)
Finance and insurance 0.093 1.098 -0.184 -0.691***
(0.161) (0.177) (0.148) (0.135)
Real estate -0.311* 0.733* -0.538*** -0.507**
(0.178) (0.130) (0.159) (0.215)
Business services -0.008 0.992 -0.245* -0.541***
(0.160) (0.159) (0.148) (0.117)
Education and health services 0.228 1.257 -0.045 -0.673***
(0.156) (0.196) (0.144) (0.113)
Information and cultural industries -0.021 0.979 -0.272 -0.550***
(0.189) (0.185) (0.180) (0.125)
Year Dummies
Year = 2000 0.011 1.011 -0.104* -0.340***
(0.065) (0.066) (0.061) (0.049)
Year = 2001 -0.057 0.944 -0.168*** -0.339***
(0.066) (0.062) (0.061) (0.060)
Year = 2002 -0.101 0.904 -0.211*** -0.305***
(0.068) (0.062) (0.064) (0.064)
Constant 2.557*** 3.696*** 0.522*
(0.406) (0.388) (0.285)
Observations 63539
Statistical significance: *=10%; **=5%; ***=1%.
Robust standard error in parantheses
35
